My recent series on modality (which terminated in this post) was never meant to conclusively prove the compossibility of foreknowledge and libertarian free will. It was only to resolve the apparent contradiction created by the facts that foreknowledge requires that there be no alternate possibilities, yet free will requires that there be alternate possibilities. (If there are alternate possible futures, how can it be known which will occur? And if the future is known, how could matters unfold any other way?) The resolution is seen by understanding that the type of alternatives required to be lacking to ground foreknowledge is different than the type of alternatives required to be present to ground free will. By showing that there are different modes of possibility I believe I nuanced the traditional Principle of Alternate Possibilities in order to show that, as far as this one particular matter is concerned, foreknowledge and free will are not mutually metaphysically exclusive.
Being a blog and not a published work, my series did not position itself into the broader ongoing dialogue in the published literature by way of citations, though it did make use of some conventional terms (in some cases intentionally flexing them). I think this is a good use for a blog: to set down some ideas whose relation to the ideas of others is not yet fully understood, which are not yet fully developed, which lack rhetorical polish, or for other reasons are not close enough to publication to be kept under wraps and about which a thinker is open to public feedback.